Below, you can find the complete reading list for the course. It is also available as a PDF file for download.

All of the papers below should be available for download from within the university (or via the university VPN).

Lecture 0

Samuelson, L. (2005). Economic theory and experimental economics. Journal of Economic Literature, 43 (1), pp. 65–107 [sections 1–3]

Lecture 1

Kagel, John and Alvin Roth, Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton, 1995. [sections 1.I-II]

Roth, Alvin E. The Early History of Experimental Economics. Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 1993, 15(2), pp. 184-209.

Lecture 2

Friedman, Daniel, and Shyam Sunder. Experimental Methods: A Primer for Economists. Cambridge (England): Cambridge University Press, 1994. [chapter 3]

Lecture 3:

Experimental Economics: Rethinking the Rules. By Nicholas Bardsley, Robin Cubitt, Graham Loomes, Peter Moffatt, Chris Starmer, and Robert Sugden. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010.

Camerer, Colin F. and Robin M. Hogarth (1999). The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 19: pp. 7-42.

Hertwig, Ralph and Andreas Ortmann. Experimental Practices in Economics: A Methodological Challenge for Psychologists? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2001, 24(3), pp. 383-402.

Holt, Charles A. and Susan K. Laury, Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects. American Economic Review, 2002, 92(5), pp. 1644-1655.

Lecture 4:

Fréchette, Guillaume R. (2011). Laboratory experiments: Professionals versus students. SSRN Electronic Journal.

Hertwig, Ralph and Andreas Ortmann. Experimental Practices in Economics: A Methodological Challenge for Psychologists? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2001, 24(3), pp. 383-402.

Lecture 5:

Levin, Irwin P., Schneider, Sandra L. and Gaeth, Gary J., (1998), All Frames Are Not Created Equal: A Typology and Critical Analysis of Framing Effects, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 76, issue 2, pp. 149-188.

Zizzo, Daniel J. (2010). Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments, Experimental Economics, 13(1): pp. 75-98.

Lecture 6:

Holt, Charles A., Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior, Pearson-Adison Wesley, 2007. [chapters 3.1-3.2]

Axelrod, R.. (1980). More Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24(3), 379–403.

Cooper, R., D. DeJong and R. Forsythe Cooperation Without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner’s Dilemma Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 1996, 12(2), pp. 187-218.

Andreoni, James and J.H.Miller. Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence. Economic Journal, 1993, 103(418), pp. 570-585. [ex. session]

Lecture 7:

Holt, Charles A., Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior, Pearson-Adison Wesley, 2007. [chapters 3.3, 12]

Van Huyck, John B., Raymond C. Battalio and Richard O. Beil. Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure. American Economic Review, 1990, 80(1), pp. 234-48.

Cooper, Russell W.,Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe and Thomas Ross. Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results. American Economic Review, 1990, 80(1), pp. 218-33. [ex. session]

Lecture 8:

Holt, Charles A., Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior, Pearson-Adison Wesley, 2007. [chapter 23]

Guth, Werner, R. Schmittberger and B. Schwartz. An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining. Journal of Games and Economic Behavior, 1982, 3(4), pp. 367-388. ['easy games' only]

Forsythe, Robert, Joel Horowitz, N.S. Savin and Martin Sefton. Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments. Games and Economic Behavior, 1994, 6(3), pp. 347-369.

Goeree, Jacob and C. Holt. Asymmetric inequality aversion and noisy behavior in alternating-offer bargaining games. European Economic Review, 2000, 44, pp. 1079-1089.

Binmore, K., Shaked, A., & Sutton, J. (1985). Testing noncooperative bargaining theory: a preliminary study, American Economic Review, 75, pp. 1178–1180.

Cherry, Todd, Peter Frykblom and Jason Shogren. Hardnose the Dictator. American Economic Review, 2002, 92(4), pp. 1218-1221.

Iriberri, N. and Rey-Biel, P. (2013), Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do?. Quantitative Economics, 4: pp. 515–547. [ex. session]

Lecture 9:

Holt, Charles A., Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior, Pearson-Adison Wesley, 2007. [chapter 24]

Berg, Joyce, John Dickhaut and Kevin McCabe. Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History. Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, 10(1), pp. 122-142.

Cox, James C. How to Identify Trust and Reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, 46(2), pp. 260-281.

Fehr, Ernst, Georg Kirchsteiger, and Arno Riedl. Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1993, 108(2), pp. 437-459.

Fehr E, Rockenbach B: Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism. Nature 2003, 422: pp. 137-140. [ex. session]

Lecture 10:

Holt, Charles A., Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior, Pearson-Adison Wesley, 2007. [chapter 26]

Marwell, Gerald and Ruth Ames. Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else? Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods, IV. Journal of Public Economics, 1981, 15(3), pp. 295-310.

Goeree, Jacob K., Charles A. Holt and S. Laury. Private Costs and Public Benefits: Unraveling the Effects of Altruism and Noisy Behavior. Journal of Public Economics, 2002, 83(2), pp. 257-278.

Croson, Rachel T.A. (1996). Partners and strangers revisited . Economics Letters 53, pp. 25–32.

Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., Fehr, E. Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Economic Letters, 2001, 71(3), pp. 397–404.

Fehr, Ernst and Simon Gachter. Coopertion and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments. American Economic Review, 2000, 90(4), pp. 980-994. [ex. session]

Lecture 11:

Holt, Charles A., Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior, Pearson-Adison Wesley, 2007. [chapter 31]

Bikhchandani, Sushil & Hirshleifer, David & Welch, Ivo, 1992. A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change in Informational Cascades, Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pp. 992-1026.

Anderson, Lisa R. and Charles A. Holt. Information Cascades in the Laboratory, American Economic Review, 1997, 87(5), pp. 847-862.

Hung, Angela A., and Charles R. Plott. 2001. Information Cascades: Replication and an Extension to Majority Rule and Conformity-Rewarding Institutions. American Economic Review, 91(5): 1508-1520. [ex. session]

Lecture 12:

Kagel, John and Alvin Roth, Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton, 1995. [Bayesian Updating and Representativeness; 596–602]

Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. (1982). Evidential impact of base rates. In: Daniel Kahneman et al. (eds.) Judgment under Uncertainty. pp. 153-160. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Grether, David M., Bayes’ Rule as a Descriptive Model: The Representativeness Heuristic, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1980, 95, pp. 537-557.

Lecture 13:

Tversky, Amos and Kahneman, Daniel. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90(4), pp. 293-315.

Charness, G., Karni, E., & Levin, D. (2010). On the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment: New experimental evidence regarding Linda. Games and Economic Behavior, 68(2), pp. 551–556.

Friedman, D. (1998). Monty Hall’s Three Doors: Construction and Deconstruction of a Choice Anomaly. American Economic Review, 88, pp. 933–946.