Below, you can find the complete reading list for the course. It is also available as a PDF file for download.
All of the papers below should be available for download from within the university (or via the university VPN).
Roth, Alvin E. The Early History of Experimental Economics. Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 1993, 15(2), pp. 184-209.
Friedman, Daniel, and Shyam Sunder. Experimental Methods: A Primer for Economists. Cambridge (England): Cambridge University Press, 1994. [chapter 3]
Experimental Economics: Rethinking the Rules. By Nicholas Bardsley, Robin Cubitt, Graham Loomes, Peter Moffatt, Chris Starmer, and Robert Sugden. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010.
Camerer, Colin F. and Robin M. Hogarth (1999). The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 19: pp. 7-42.
Hertwig, Ralph and Andreas Ortmann. Experimental Practices in Economics: A Methodological Challenge for Psychologists? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2001, 24(3), pp. 383-402.
Holt, Charles A. and Susan K. Laury, Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects. American Economic Review, 2002, 92(5), pp. 1644-1655.
Fréchette, Guillaume R. (2011). Laboratory experiments: Professionals versus students. SSRN Electronic Journal.
Hertwig, Ralph and Andreas Ortmann. Experimental Practices in Economics: A Methodological Challenge for Psychologists? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2001, 24(3), pp. 383-402.
Levin, Irwin P., Schneider, Sandra L. and Gaeth, Gary J., (1998), All Frames Are Not Created Equal: A Typology and Critical Analysis of Framing Effects, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 76, issue 2, pp. 149-188.
Zizzo, Daniel J. (2010). Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments, Experimental Economics, 13(1): pp. 75-98.
Holt, Charles A., Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior, Pearson-Adison Wesley, 2007. [chapters 3.1-3.2]
Axelrod, R.. (1980). More Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24(3), 379–403.
Cooper, R., D. DeJong and R. Forsythe Cooperation Without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner’s Dilemma Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 1996, 12(2), pp. 187-218.
Andreoni, James and J.H.Miller. Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence. Economic Journal, 1993, 103(418), pp. 570-585. [ex. session]
Holt, Charles A., Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior, Pearson-Adison Wesley, 2007. [chapters 3.3, 12]
Van Huyck, John B., Raymond C. Battalio and Richard O. Beil. Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure. American Economic Review, 1990, 80(1), pp. 234-48.
Cooper, Russell W.,Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe and Thomas Ross. Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results. American Economic Review, 1990, 80(1), pp. 218-33. [ex. session]
Holt, Charles A., Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior, Pearson-Adison Wesley, 2007. [chapter 23]
Guth, Werner, R. Schmittberger and B. Schwartz. An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining. Journal of Games and Economic Behavior, 1982, 3(4), pp. 367-388. ['easy games' only]
Forsythe, Robert, Joel Horowitz, N.S. Savin and Martin Sefton. Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments. Games and Economic Behavior, 1994, 6(3), pp. 347-369.
Goeree, Jacob and C. Holt. Asymmetric inequality aversion and noisy behavior in alternating-offer bargaining games. European Economic Review, 2000, 44, pp. 1079-1089.
Binmore, K., Shaked, A., & Sutton, J. (1985). Testing noncooperative bargaining theory: a preliminary study, American Economic Review, 75, pp. 1178–1180.
Cherry, Todd, Peter Frykblom and Jason Shogren. Hardnose the Dictator. American Economic Review, 2002, 92(4), pp. 1218-1221.
Iriberri, N. and Rey-Biel, P. (2013), Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do?. Quantitative Economics, 4: pp. 515–547. [ex. session]
Holt, Charles A., Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior, Pearson-Adison Wesley, 2007. [chapter 24]
Berg, Joyce, John Dickhaut and Kevin McCabe. Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History. Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, 10(1), pp. 122-142.
Cox, James C. How to Identify Trust and Reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, 46(2), pp. 260-281.
Fehr, Ernst, Georg Kirchsteiger, and Arno Riedl. Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1993, 108(2), pp. 437-459.
Fehr E, Rockenbach B: Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism. Nature 2003, 422: pp. 137-140. [ex. session]
Holt, Charles A., Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior, Pearson-Adison Wesley, 2007. [chapter 26]
Marwell, Gerald and Ruth Ames. Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else? Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods, IV. Journal of Public Economics, 1981, 15(3), pp. 295-310.
Goeree, Jacob K., Charles A. Holt and S. Laury. Private Costs and Public Benefits: Unraveling the Effects of Altruism and Noisy Behavior. Journal of Public Economics, 2002, 83(2), pp. 257-278.
Croson, Rachel T.A. (1996). Partners and strangers revisited . Economics Letters 53, pp. 25–32.
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., Fehr, E. Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Economic Letters, 2001, 71(3), pp. 397–404.
Fehr, Ernst and Simon Gachter. Coopertion and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments. American Economic Review, 2000, 90(4), pp. 980-994. [ex. session]